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Lessons for Children’s Rights from Disability Rights? 
 
1. Introduction: is there anything new for children in the CRPD? 
 
1.1 A pessimistic reading 
 
This chapter asks whether International Child Law (ICL) can learn any lessons from recent 
developments in International Disability Law (IDL). At first glance, this might perhaps seem 
to be an odd question. After all, the main instrument of ICL, the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), is now more than 25 years old whereas the IDL equivalent, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is a much 
younger document. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, on 13 December 
2006, opened for signing in March 2007, and came into force, following its 20th ratification, on 
3 May 2008.1 In a sense, the CRC is the adult and the CRPD is the child, and it might appear 
more likely that the CRPD could take lessons from the CRC than vice-versa. One reason for 
holding this view is that ICL has in the 21st century moved decisively from questions relating 
to the articulation of rights in abstract textual form to their realisation in practice. A decade or 
so ago, Kofi Annan called, in the context of child soldiers, for an ‘era of application’,2 and this 
is an apt description of the current state of international children’s rights more generally. 
Children’s rights were closely interwoven into the pursuit of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) set in 2000, and we have in recent times seen time-bound campaigns aimed at 
the abolition of the worst forms of child labour by 2016; education for all by 2015; the 
eradication of FGM ‘within a generation’; the eradication of child soldiers; and a whole host 
of sub-goals. All of these developments, grounded in ICL, were well underway whilst those 
interested in disability rights were still trying to agree the substantive content and scope of IDL 
and the text of the CRPD. As a consequence, for example, the MDGs do not make any mention 
of disability. 
 
Moreover, when the finished text of the CRPD did emerge, it was presented, in UN discourse 
at least, as not particularly innovative. The CRPD was conceptualised as an ‘implementa t ion 
                                        
1
 As of 26 May 2016, the Convention had been signed by 160 and ratified by 164 state parties. Its Optional Protocol had attracted 92 
signatures and 89 ratifications by the same date http://www.un.org/disabilities/.  
2
 United Nations, Children and Armed Conflict Report of the Secretary General, A/58/546–S/2003/1053, para. 104. 
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convention’,3 designed not to create new rights but, rather, to implement existing human rights 
law4 in the field of disability: all prior-existing international human rights treaties (bar the CRC: 
see below) having been silent on the particular difficulties faced by people with disabilit ies. 
According to the United Nations Disabilities Handbook for Parliamentarians, ‘The 
Convention is a complement to existing international human rights treaties. It does not 
recognize any new human rights of persons with disabilities, but rather clarifies the obligat ions 
and legal duties of States to respect and ensure the equal enjoyment of all human rights by all 
persons with disabilities’.5 This is reflected in Article 1, the first of two interpretative articles, 
which states that the purpose of the CRPD is to: 
 
Promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disability, and to promote respect for their 
dignity. 
 
Article 1 is buttressed by the statement of the general obligations of state parties in Art 4, which 
is to bring about ‘the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
persons with disabilities’. The CRPD was, in essence, presented at the time of its emergence 
as a corrective rather than an innovative measure, as far as the broader human rights landscape 
was concerned. 
 
A quick perusal of the text of the CRPD appears to confirm a conservative view of its wider 
import. It contains what looks like a fairly standard list of political/civil and social, economic 
and cultural rights. Political and civil rights in the CRPD include: 
 
Art 10: Right to Life 
Art 13: Access to Justice 
Art 14: Liberty and Security of the Person 
Art 15: Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
                                        
3
  UN Press Releases, ‘Chairman says draft convention sets out ‘detailed code of implementation and spells out how individual rights should 
be put into practice’, 15 August 2005, SOC/4680, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/soc4680.doc.htm last accessed 25 
May 2015. 
4
 I.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR). Both the CRC and the CRPD are included in the n ine core 
UN treaties: See The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx last accessed 25 May 2015. 
5
 UN Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(un-DEsa), Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (oHcHr), Inter-Parliamentary Union No 14-2007 (2007) United Nations Handbook for Parliamentarians, From Exclusion to 
Equality, Realizing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations), 5. 
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Art 16: Freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse 
Art 18: Liberty and Nationality 
Art 21: Freedom of Expression 
Art 22: Privacy 
Art 23: Home and Family 
Art 29: Participation in Political and Public Life. 
 
Social, economic and cultural rights in the CRPD include: 
 
Art 24: Education 
Art 25: Health 
Art 27: Work and Employment 
Art 28: Standard of Living and Social Protection 
Art 30: Participation in Cultural Life, Recreation and Sport 
 
Moreover, the CRPD apparently stays on traditional ground as far as the realisation of human 
rights is concerned. Article 4.2 uses the familiar form of words which provides that although 
political and civil rights are ‘immediately applicable according to international law’, a state 
party must work towards the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights ‘to the 
maximum of its available resources’. There is little scope here, or so it would seem, for the 
CRPD to provide some ‘added value’ to the CRC.  
 
The repudiation of any innovative aspect to the CRPD at the general level is repeated in the 
particular context of the rights of children. Although containing a number of specific provisions 
relating to children with disabilities, the CRPD has been presented as being concerned 
primarily with the rights of adults; and it has not attracted much attention from those in the 
academic community interested in the rights of children.6 This may be because of an 
understanding that the approach taken in the CRPD is to channel the rights of children with 
disabilities back into the rights regime that applies to other children under the CRC. Paragraph 
(r) of the Preamble to the CRPD recognises that children with disabilities ‘should have full 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children, 
                                        
6
 For a rare example, see Georgette Mulheir ‘Deinstitutionalisation – A Human Rights Priority for Children with Disabilities’ (2012) 9 The 
Equal Rights Review 117. 
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and recalls ‘obligations to that end undertaken by State Parties to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child’. Article 7 of the CRPD, which is headed ‘Children with disabilities’, is as follows: 
 
1. States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by 
children with disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal 
basis with other children. 
 
 2. In all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration. 
 
 3. States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the right to express 
their views freely on all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in 
accordance with their age and maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be 
provided with disability and age-appropriate assistance to realize that right. 
 
Articles 7.2 and 7.3 are of course familiar to international child lawyers as reworked versions 
of Arts 3.1 and 12 of the CRC. Read together with the reference to ‘other children’ in Art 7.1 
and in the Preamble, it seems clear that the intention behind the CRPD in relation to children 
is as it is more generally, to offer the same level of human rights protection to the target group 
as is enjoyed by other citizens, to remove discrimination and equalise the position of children 
with disabilities, but not to enhance the rights protection of children generally.  
 
As preamble para (r) makes clear, the CRPD was drafted with the existing provision in respect 
of children with disabilities in the CRC in mind. Article 2 CRC prohibits discrimination against 
a child for a number of reasons, including disability. Article 23 provides a rare pre-2006 
example of a stand-alone provision regarding disability rights and commits state parties to 
ensure the provision of ‘special care’ for children with disabilities in a wide variety of fields 
on account of their ‘special needs’: 
 
1. States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a 
full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and 
facilitate the child's active participation in the community. 
2. States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care and shall 
encourage and ensure the extension, subject to available resources, to the eligible child 
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and those responsible for his or her care, of assistance for which application is made 
and which is appropriate to the child's condition and to the circumstances of the parents 
or others caring for the child. 
3. Recognizing the special needs of a disabled child, assistance extended in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of the present article shall be provided free of charge, whenever 
possible, taking into account the financial resources of the parents or others caring for 
the child, and shall be designed to ensure that the disabled child has effective access to 
and receives education, training, health care services, rehabilitation services, 
preparation for employment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive to the 
child's achieving the fullest possible social integration and individual development, 
including his or her cultural and spiritual development. 
4. States Parties shall promote, in the spirit of international cooperation, the exchange 
of appropriate information in the field of preventive health care and of medical, 
psychological and functional treatment of disabled children, including dissemination of 
and access to information concerning methods of rehabilitation, education and 
vocational services, with the aim of enabling States Parties to improve their capabilit ies 
and skills and to widen their experience in these areas. In this regard, particular account 
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries. 
 
Given the prior existence of Art 23 CRC, many delegates were of the opinion during the 
drafting of the CRPD that there should be no reference to children in the new convention,7 and 
specific mention was ultimately made of children with disabilities in the CRPD only on the 
basis that to do so would not conflict with Art 23 CRC.8 All of this seems to indicate that we 
should not expect too much in terms of innovation for children’s rights from this quarter , 
particularly as Art 23.2 identifies the right of the disabled child to special care as a social right, 
and the extent of its realisation therefore subject to the availability of resources. 
 
1.2 An optimistic reading 
 
The above sketch of the CRPD bears scant resemblance to the way in which the convention 
has been analysed in some of the academic literature. For Amita Dhanda, for example, the 
                                        
7
 Marianne Schulz, Understanding The UN Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities (3rd ed, Handicap International, 2009) 
69. 
8
 Schulz (n 7), ibid. 
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CRPD can be seen in terms of nothing less than ‘constructing a new human rights lexicon’. 9 
For Frédéric Mégret, in a similar vein: 
 
…the Disabilities Convention has an approach to the issue of rights which rather 
cavalierly (but very beneﬁcially) ignores or reinvents some perennial dichotomies of 
the ‘mainstream’ of human rights. This is, I contend, because disability forces human 
rights lawyers to reexamine some core assumptions about what the needs of human 
beings are, and how these relate to society and the state. There is a lesson in this for 
human rights itself, of course, which can gain tremendously from the resulting, more 
holistic, concept of rights that emerges.10 
 
Mégret argues that disability forces this re-examination because of the radical developments in 
its underpinning model which have occurred over the past few decades. It is not contentious to 
state that the field of disability has been transformed over that period at the level of its 
conceptual base. From a starting position which viewed disability in welfarist, charitable and 
medicalised terms, with state policy the collective expression of pity for the inherent disability 
of the sufferer, disability is now seen instead in terms of human rights and equality ‘premised 
on a holistic “social model”’11 of disability, which understands, as it is put at para (e) of the 
Preamble to the CRPD, that ‘disability results from the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others’.  
 
The CRPD itself is the best and most concrete expression of this change of thinking. The point 
is put more concisely by Thomas Hammarberg, at the time Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights, writing the Key Note introduction to a Special Edition of the European 
Human Rights Law Review on the CRPD published in 2011, ‘we have come to see the source 
of the problem: the society’s attitude towards persons with disabilities’.12 This may be putting 
the point too strongly. As Judith Butler for one has pointed out,13 as embodied beings there is 
a material reality to our existence which is beyond social or psychic construction, just as the 
                                        
9
 A Dhanda,‘Constructing a new human rights lexicon: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’  (2008) 8 International 
Journal of Human Rights 43. 
10
 Frédéric Mégret ,‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’ (2008) 12(2) The International Journal of Human 
Rights, 261, 262. 
11
 Grainne de Birca ‘The European Union in the negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’  (2010) European Law Review, 174, 175. 
12 Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Disability rights: from charity to equality’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 638-641 at 639. 
13 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: on the discursive limits of ‘sex’ (Routledge, 1993). 
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child exists beyond any social or cultural construction of childhood. Social attitudes are not the 
sole cause of individual disability. But social attitudes, norms and practices are certainly major 
and variable vectors of disability-related discrimination. They may not constitute the entirety 
of ‘the problem’, of what is problematic about, disability; but they do constitute a very 
significant part of it, and it is the part which can, in theory at least, be most readily attended to 
and even prevented from arising by state action underpinned by a discourse of rights and 
equality.  
 
How this links to the way in which rights are understood is that a ‘holistic’ approach entails 
the undermining of traditional divisions within orthodox human rights discourse. For example, 
the right to vote is for a person with a perambulatory disability of little use unless the polling 
station is accessible to persons with his or her particular disability. Hence, the exercise of a 
political right – the right to vote - depends intimately for its realisation in practice on the reality 
of a social right – the right of access. To generalise the point, it is that the realisation of politica l 
and civil rights is dependent on the prior or simultaneous realisation of social, economic and 
cultural rights. Work in this area chimes with the development of theories of vulnerability by 
writers such as Fineman,14 who argues that it is the vulnerability which constitutes us all in our 
humanity which should underpin human rights, because to realise that we are all vulnerable to 
illness, disability or other misfortune, is, again, to recognise the social underpinning of the civil 
and political rights of the individual.  
 
It is on this basis that Mégret proceeds to argue that the CRPD reconfigures four major 
distinctions in international law, between types of rights (political and social, negative and 
positive, and so on); between actors (state as principal actor and other actors); in terms of the 
‘intensity’ of rights (immediate realisation and progressive realisation); and modes of 
implementation (law and policy). Indeed, returning to Art 7.3 of the CRPD, it can be seen that 
the modification of that article by comparison to Art 12 CRC, which is achieved by adding its 
final stanza, requires that a child with disabilities is afforded not merely the right to free 
expression of his or her views and for those views to be given due weight, but also the right ‘to 
be provided with disability and age-appropriate assistance to realize that right’. The assistance, 
as well as the substantive right to be heard, must be ‘ensured’ by the state (the whole of Art 7.3 
being governed by the state’s obligation to ‘ensure’ that its aims be achieved). The right to 
                                        
14 Martha A. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism, 1. 
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assistance – a social right – has been tagged on to the right to be heard – a civil right – and, 
seemingly, made subject to the same obligation to immediate realisation. This indivisibility of 
rights gives expression to a prior understanding of the indivisibility of needs and, ultimate ly, 
the indivisibility of the self. 
 
In addition, Art 4.2 - although repeating the orthodox distinction between, on the one hand, 
civil and political rights, which are ‘immediately applicable according to international law’ 
and, on the other, economic, social and cultural rights, which are subject to progressive 
realisation as resources permit - is worded differently from other versions of the distinct ion, 
such as that found in Art 4 CRC. The distinction in the CRPD must be read according to Art 
4.2 ‘without prejudice to those obligations contained in the present Convention that are 
immediately applicable according to international law’. It might be that ‘those obligations’ 
refers only to civil and political rights, but if that was the case, civil and political rights could 
have been explicitly mentioned in Art 4.2 and contrasted with economic, social and cultura l 
rights -  which Art 4.2 does specifically refer to -  and so arguably the best interpretation of its 
final stanza is that it countenances that some CRPD rights conventionally seen as economic, 
social or cultural could nonetheless be subject to immediate realisation; which lends support, 
for example, to the above reading of the significance of Art 7.3. At the very least, the final 
stanza of Art 4.2 introduces some ambiguity into interpretations of its potential scope and 
effect. 
 
Other elements of the CRPD are equally intriguing and thought-provoking for internationa l 
children’s rights strategists. For instance, the CRPD exhibits an attitude towards a role for a 
test of capacity which lies somewhere between sceptical and downright hostile. It has been 
argued by some, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,15 that capacity as a 
mechanism for the removal of rights has been jettisoned altogether by the CRPD, which if 
correct means that only ICL retains faith in the concept of capacity as an acceptable mechanism 
to regulate the exercise of rights by the right-holder, and suggests that it is at least worthwhile 
to investigate whether the same arguments that have been so influential in IDL should also be 
considered in ICL. It is important to understand that there is controversy and, as of yet, a lack 
of clarity about exactly what the CRPD represents in terms of innovation. Some academic 
voices are circumspect about the extent to which the CRPD can be seen as a radical departure 
                                        
15
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report A/HRC/10/48, 26 January 2009, paras 45, 47. 
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from existing norms of both international human rights law and practice and disability law and 
practice,16 but there is a broad consensus that, even if the CRPD does not as it stands exemplify 
the claims made for it by Mégret, then it certainly has the potential to do so.  
 
There are further factors which suggest that the possible impact of the CRPD on ICL may be 
worth pondering. The CRPD follows earlier conventions such as the CRC by establishing a 
committee of experts, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (in Art 34), to 
which state parties must report, initially within two years of the convention coming into force 
in the jurisdiction in question, and thereafter every four years (Art 35) on progress in meeting 
the requirements of the convention. And as with the CRC, there is an Optional Protocol (OP) 
to the CRPD,17 under the terms of which the Committee on the CRPD can hear complaints 
made by or on behalf of individuals. But unlike the CRC, the OP to the CRPD was opened for 
signature alongside the main convention in March 2007, whereas the OP to the CRC was only 
added recently, more than two decades after the parent convention.18 That the CRC existed for 
many years without such an OP perhaps demonstrates that it is in some sense ‘old-fashioned’, 
the product of the thinking of an earlier, more cautious generation of human rights advocates. 
Certainly, in the years after 1989, public international law has at a general level begun to 
encompass the claims of individuals, rather than regulating only the relationship between 
states. Perhaps, then, the CRPD does contain what Dhanda has termed ‘the wisdom of a 
straggler’.19  
 
The final reason for optimism is that the arguments against specific mention of children in the 
CRPD, although forcefully made, were, as seen, ultimately unsuccessful. The day was won by 
the opposing view: that it was necessary to include specific provision for children with 
disabilities in the new convention because such children must often deal with issues that are 
not faced by other children or by adults with disabilities: issues such as the failure to register 
the birth of a disabled child or the particular discrimination and threats including violence that 
are faced by children with disabilities. So, although allegedly not conflicting with Art 23 CRC, 
the CRPD is intended to extend and increase the protection given to the rights of children with 
disabilities, over and above that provided by the CRC, to the extent necessary to equalise the 
                                        
16
 P. Fennell and U. Khaliq ‘Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN Disability Rights Convention, The European Convent ion 
on Human Rights and English Law’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 662, 669; P. Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75(5) Modern Law Review 752. 
17 UNGA, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,  A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007. 
18
 UNGA, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, A/RES/66/138, 27 January 2012. 
19
 Dhanda (n 9), 48. 
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position of all children. In fact, as will be discussed shortly, not only does the CRPD make 
specific provision for children with disabilities in Art 7, it also weaves the rights of children 
with disabilities right across the text of the convention.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will pursue this optimistic reading of the potential for the 
improvement of the rights of children offered by the CRPD. I will first discuss the new rights 
for children with disabilities to be found in the CRPD, then consider the extent to which the 
convention provides new rights for all, before moving on to discuss the ways in which it also 
extends and reconfigures existing rights. Finally, I shall give some space to the implicat ions 
for the continued desirability of a role of ‘capacity’ and ‘best interests’ as mechanisms for 
making decisions in relation to children, in the light of the significant departures in this respect 
contained in the CRPD.  
 
2. New rights for children with disabilities 
 
The CRPD aims to implement a sophisticated strategy in pursuit of the goal of equal rights for 
children with disabilities. It adopts a different approach from that taken in the CRC. In the 
CRC, as seen above, one article is allocated specifically to the rights of children with 
disabilities, leaving those interpreting the convention to read those rights into its other articles 
for themselves, albeit with rather belated assistance from the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child.20 The CRPD, by contrast, both highlights the specific situation of children with 
disabilities (in Art 7, discussed above) and weaves the particular rights and entitlements of 
children with disabilities by way of numerous further references into the final text of the CRPD 
more generally. This strategy is perhaps something that any revised version of the CRC could 
usefully adopt.21 In terms of the second strand of this strategy, which can be called 
‘mainstreaming’: 
 
 One of the general principles of the CRPD, Art 3(h), requires ‘Respect for the evolving 
capacities of children with disabilities and respect for the right of children with 
disabilities to preserve their identities’;  
                                        
20 The CRC published a General Comment on the rights of children with disabilities in early 2007 (prompted, it seems, by activity around 
the CRPD), advising state parties that the rights of children with disabilities must be implemented ‘in a comprehensive manner which covers 
all provisions of the [CRC]’. CRC Committee ‘General Comment number 9: The rights of children with disabilities’ UN Doc CRC/C/CG9, 
27
th
 February 2007, para. 6. 
21
 The CRC Committee implicitly acknowledges this lacuna in the protection offered to children with disabilities by the CRC by elaborating 
a mainstreaming programme in its General Comment number 9. 
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 There is an obligation placed on state parties to consult persons with disabilities in 
developing national law and policy in conformity with the CRPD, which extends to 
children with disabilities, albeit through their representative organizations (Art 4.3);  
 There is an obligation placed on state parties to foster at all levels of the education 
system, including in all children from an early age, an attitude of respect for the rights 
of persons with disabilities (Art 8.2(b)); 
 There is an obligation placed on state parties to put in place effective legislation and 
policies, including child-focused legislation and policies, to ensure that instances of 
exploitation, violence and abuse against persons with disabilities are identified, 
investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted (Art 16.5);  
 There is an obligation imposed on state parties to take effective and appropriate steps 
to ensure, inter alia, that all persons with disabilities, including children, retain their 
fertility on an equal basis with others (Art 23.1(c)); 
 There is an obligation placed on state parties to ensure that children with disabilit ies 
have equal rights with respect to family life. With a view to realizing these rights, and 
to prevent concealment, abandonment, neglect and segregation of children with 
disabilities, state parties shall undertake to provide early and comprehens ive 
information, services and support to children with disabilities and their families (Art 
23.3); 
 Children with disabilities have a right not to be separated from their parents against 
their parents’ will except by legal process which acts only in the best interests of the 
child, and ‘In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a disability 
of either the child or one or both of the parents’ (Art. 23.4);  
 There is an obligation placed on state parties, where the immediate family is unable to 
care for a child with disabilities, to undertake every effort to provide alternative care 
within the wider family, and failing that, within the community in a family setting (Art. 
23.5); 
 Children with disabilities have a right not to be excluded from the general education 
system and from free primary and secondary education on the basis of disability (Art 
24.2(a));  
 There is an obligation placed on state parties to provide those health services needed by 
persons with disabilities specifically because of their disabilities, including early 
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identification and intervention as appropriate, and services designed to minimize and 
prevent further disabilities, including among children and older persons (Art 25(b)); 
 There is an obligation placed on state parties to ensure that children with disabilit ies 
have equal access to play, recreation and sporting facilities (Art 30.5(d)). 
 
There is also specific mention of the rights of blind, deaf and deafblind children,22 and of the 
rights of girl-children with disabilities.23  
 
There are two issues here. The first is the technical question, of whether the concept of 
mainstreaming is better supported, as it is in ICL, by one dedicated article in the text of the 
convention supported by an explanatory General Comment, or by specific and systematic 
sequence of references on the face of the convention itself. It seems clear that the latter course, 
the one adopted with the CRPD, is preferable. The second issue concerns substance. The 
language relating to children in the main body of the CRPD, as with that used in Art 7, the 
dedicated article, is sometimes borrowed wholesale from the CRC. For example, Art 23.4 
CRPD contains the right of the child ‘not be separated from his or her parents against their will, 
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the 
child’ found in Art 9 CRC. But there are clearly new rights for children with disabilit ies 
included in the above list.  
 
Some of these are addressed at wrongs that have historically been suffered by children and 
families living with disability. One important example is the obligation placed on states to 
ensure that ‘all persons with disabilities, including children, retain their fertility on an equal 
basis with others’, found in Art 23.1(c), which prohibits eugenic or quasi-eugenic practices 
incompatible with the right to procreate of persons with disabilities. Further examples include 
Art 23.4’s stipulation, that ‘In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a 
disability of either the child or one or both of the parents’, and Art 23.5’s requirement that 
states ‘undertake every effort to provide alternative care within the wider family, and failing 
that, within the community in a family setting’ when it is necessary in the best interests of a 
child to remove him or her from the parental home.  
                                        
22
 Art 24.3(c). 
23
 Preamble para (q); Art 6.1 and Art 28.2(b). 
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It might be argued that Art 23.4, which seems to place an absolute embargo on factoring 
disability into best interests-based decision-making, actually goes considerably further than 
was needed to address the discriminatory practice, of removing children with disabilities from 
their families and raising them instead in state institutions. There will, inevitably, be situations 
in which a contextualised, reasonable and sometimes morally imperative, judgment will be 
made that, because of the presence of some physical or mental impairment of either parent 
and/or child, it is in the best interests of the child to be separated from his or her family, whether 
permanently or temporarily (and Art 23.4 contains no temporal reference). Such situations are 
by definition extreme in their facts and should be rare, but they will and do arise. Here the 
CRPD seems to exhibit dogma which does not countenance (what will sometimes be) the 
realities of the situation. But concerns that this provision has been drafted too widely or too 
clumsily in no way detract from its importance or, indeed, necessity, as a mechanism to 
condemn and ultimately, facilitate the eradication of, state policies and practices which prefer 
or allow the routine institutionalisation of children with disabilities. Shifting care wholly out 
of institutions and into the family or, failing that, the wider community, as required by Arts. 
23.4 and 23.5, naturally entails the reallocation, and most probably, the provision of further, 
resources, and provides leverage for NGOs and the international community at large to bring 
pressure to bear on recalcitrant governments. These provisions, then, do enhance the protection 
of children with disabilities over and above that offered by Arts 2 and 23 CRC. They are also 
a long way, in philosophical terms, from accepting the propriety of the ‘placement in suitable 
institutions for the care of children’ of children removed from their families, licensed by Art 
20.3 CRC. 
 
Some rights found in the CRC, namely the right, in Art 5, to have evolving capacities 
recognised, or that in Art 8, to have one’s identity preserved, have been elevated to the status 
of a general principle in the CRPD. Others - such as the obligation placed by Art 16.5 CRPD 
on states in respect of exploitation, violence and abuse suffered by children with disabilities – 
which is reminiscent of Art 19 CRC, provide added value because, unlike that article, Art 16.5 
CRPD contains specific reference to the obligation to prosecute where appropriate. Other rights 
still are genuinely novel. The right of disabled children to be consulted by states when bringing 
national law into conformity with the CRPD, found in Art 4.3 CRPD, goes beyond anything 
guaranteed by the CRC. The obligation on the state to ensure that disabled children have equal 
rights with respect to family life in Art 23.3 CRPD is couched in much more positive terms 
than the negative formulation of Art 16 CRC, which merely forbids ‘arbitrary or unlawful 
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interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence’. Moreover, Art 23.3 
provides further that ‘With a view to realizing these rights, and to prevent concealment, 
abandonment, neglect and segregation of children with disabilities, States Parties shall 
undertake to provide early and comprehensive information, services and support to children 
with disabilities and their families’. Again, there is no comparable obligation to be found in the 
CRC.  
 
As can be seen, at least some of these rights entail positive obligations being placed on state 
parties, and even if the scope of these obligations is (albeit to an uncertain extent) limited by 
Art 4.2 in respect of economic, social and cultural rights, these are positive developments for 
children with disabilities. For example, the right of children with disabilities, not to be excluded 
from the general education system and from free primary and secondary education on the basis 
of disability in Art 24.2(a) should trigger reinterpretation of the way in which ‘special care’ 
and ‘special needs’ in Art 23.2 and 23.3 CRC have often been interpreted, which is that children 
with disabilities should be educated outside of mainstream or general education. This is 
buttressed by the requirements, in Art 30.5(d) CRPD, that children with disabilities are afforded 
equal access to play, recreation and sporting facilities ‘including those activities in the school 
system’, and in Art 8.2(b), to foster an attitude of respect for children with disabilities ‘at all 
levels of the education system, including in all children from an early age’. Finally, in terms of 
new rights, the obligation placed on states by Art 25(b) to provide bespoke health services, 
including preventative services, for children with disabilities is a potentially very valuable 
addition to the rights of children with disabilities, and compares favourably with the 
requirement of Art 23.3 CRC, which provides only that children with disabilities be afforded 
‘effective access’ to health and other services. In summary, the CRPD can be seen as providing 
disability rights advocates, and those advocating the rights of children with disabilities, with a 
truly dynamic set of rhetorical and political tools, to encourage change which is as much a 
matter of adopting new ways of thinking about children with disabilities as it is to do with the 
dedication of additional resources. 
 
3. New rights for all? 
 
Don Mackay, the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral Convention 
to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, did not actually say 
that the CRPD was not intended to create new rights. Rather, he said that the CRPD does not 
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‘for the most part’24 create new rights, which is not the same thing at all, and the CRPD does 
indeed contain some rights which may have the potential to benefit all children. A key example 
is Art 17, which provides that ‘Every person with disabilities has a right to respect for his or 
her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others’. There is no equivalent stand-
alone right to respect for integrity in any other UN human rights convention.  This article 
reflects, albeit obliquely, concern for the particular vulnerability of persons with intellectua l 
disabilities or mental health difficulties to compulsory medical treatment and detention, but in 
its final form is of more general, and unspecified, scope and application.  
 
It is an open question whether the presence of Art 17 in the CRPD indicates that earlier 
conventions, including the CRC, should be modified in some way so as to also include this 
right. The right to physical and mental integrity is inherent in many of the CRC’s articles, such 
as the Art 19 right to freedom from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, 
neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse; or the Art 
39 right to physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of 
any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse, torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, or armed conflicts. But these articles have so far proven 
blind to such problematic issues as, for example, the circumcision of boy children,25 whereas a 
right to physical and mental integrity might have more purchase in this regard.  
 
Additionally, Arts 3(f) and 9 place an obligation on state parties to ensure access to the physical 
and virtual environment and to transportation for disabled persons, and to develop and 
promulgate minimum standards and guidelines for access to all spaces open to the public, 
including private spaces. Space precludes fuller discussion here, but there may be scope to 
adapt Art 9 to the situation of children/the CRC. Indeed, it may be that compliance with Art 9 
as it stands will be of benefit to all persons, including children, not just those with disabilit ies, 
if it entails the improvement of the local environment or the provision of facilities such as play 
areas, for example. 
 
4. Extending and reconfiguring existing rights 
 
                                        
24
 UN (n 3). 
25
 There is a huge literature on this topic. Examples include: J. S. Svoboda ‘Circumcision of male infants as a human rights violation’ (2013) 
39 Journal of Medical Ethics 469; J. Mazor ‘The child’s interests and the case for the permissibility of male infant circumcision’ (2013) 39 
Journal of Medical Ethics 421; P.W. Adler ‘Is Circumcision Legal?’ (2013) XVI(iii) Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 439. 
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The significance of the CRPD lies as much in how existing rights are presented and refashioned 
as it does in providing new rights. For example, although the right to life in Art 10 CRPD 
merely ‘reaffirms’ that right and seeks to ensure its effective enjoyment by persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others, Art 11 extends that protection explicitly to ‘situat ions 
of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of 
natural disasters’. One might question whether this extension will make much practical 
difference in such situations, but it is welcome if for no other reason than it strengthens the 
hand of children’s rights advocates, and this is at least one idea that could usefully be borrowed 
by the CRC. Indeed, it seems odd that the right to life of a disabled child is better protected in 
this sense than the right to life of other children. This is not the only example of existing rights 
being extended in novel ways: another is the elevation of the right to participate effectively in 
society to a general principle (Arts 3(c) and 29), which goes beyond the narrow scope of Art 
12 CRC, and which could usefully be followed in other areas including ICL.26  
 
With regards to reconfiguring, the CRPD gives old rights a new twist. At several points, the 
convention blurs the distinction between civil/political rights and economic, social and cultura l 
rights. For instance, the right to liberty of movement, in Art 18, is followed, in Art 19, by the 
right to live independently in the community, involving the positive obligation of state parties 
to provide a range of permanent residential accommodation (for those who desire it) and 
provide those services to persons with disabilities in their own homes and at locations within 
communities which are necessary to facilitate ‘full enjoyment’ of that right. Art 20 simila r ly 
requires state parties to facilitate the personal mobility of persons with disabilities ‘and at an 
affordable cost’. It is clear from the way that these articles unfold that the view embedded in 
the convention is that civil and political rights depend for their realisation on the parallel 
realisation of economic, social or cultural rights.27  
 
Elsewhere, political/civil rights are conflated with economic, social and cultural rights within 
the same article, which is an even more radical restructuring of the relationship between them. 
For example, the right of equality before the law is interweaved by Art 13.1 with an obligat ion 
                                        
26
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recognised Art 12 CRC as having the status of a general principle of the CRC (CRC 
Committee ‘General Comment No.12 on the Right of the Child Too Be Heard’ (2009), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/12, 1 July 2009, para. 2), but 
the way in which Art  12 has been interpreted to date has often led to participation which is less than ‘effective’: see for example L. Lundy 
‘Voice is not enough: Conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2007) 33(6) British 
Educational Research Journal 927; A. Nolan ‘The Child as 'Democratic Citizen' – Challenging the “Participation Gap”’ (2010) 4(Winter) 
Public Law, 767. 
27
 Although I don’t agree with Kayess and French that the rights in Arts 19 and 20 are, as they claim, ‘despite their appearance, civil and 
political rights’: R. Kayess and P. French ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8:1 Human Rights Law Review, 1, 29. 
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placed on state parties to provide ‘procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to 
facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all 
legal proceedings, including investigative and other preliminary stages’, coupled with training 
for criminal justice personnel (Art. 13.2). It seems, as access to justice is a political right, that 
lack of resources is not a good reason to fail to implement Art 13. 
 
The same pattern is found in Art 21, which opens with a fairly standard version of the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion and requires state parties to ensure equal exercise of that 
right to persons with disabilities, then goes considerably further, imposing positive obligat ions 
on state parties to provide information intended for the general public in a form suitable for 
persons with disabilities at no cost (Art 21(a)), to facilitating the use of sign language, Braille 
and ‘all other accessible means, modes and formats of communication’ at the choice of the 
person with disabilities (Art 21(b)), as well as ‘urging’ private entities and the mass media to 
do the same (Arts 21(c) and (d)). This has been described by Kayess and French as 
‘intriguing’.28 This is because in their view Art 21 seemingly implements a civil right (freedom 
of expression and opinion): and yet, on a natural reading, it seems that the economic, social 
and cultural aspects of Art 21 are subsumed by its overarching quality as a civil/political right.  
 
This reading is supported by the structure of Art 21, which renders the civil/political right, in 
Art 21.1, as the main focus of the article, with the positive obligations then placed on state 
parties to realise that right as Arts 21.1.a, 1.b and 1.c, which suggest that they are sub-
components of that right; there is no Art 21.2. If this analysis is correct, then the CRPD 
demonstrates how it is possible, in effect, to convert an aspiration into a positive obligation to 
be realised immediately. This might be a lesson of value to children’s rights strategists – 
although it seems to require change at the level of the wording of the text of the CRC to import 
this into children’s rights. If the CRPD proves to set some sort of blueprint for the future 
articulation of rights – this novel conflation of the civil and the political with the economic, 
social and cultural – then the CRC will appear increasingly out of date. 
 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the reading offered by Kayess and French will be 
shared by state parties and the CRPD Committee. It might be a neat textual conjuring trick to 
convert the aspirational into the enforceable in the way done by Art 21 and other articles within 
                                        
28
 Kayess and French (n 26), 29. 
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the CRPD, but that does not sit comfortably with the retention of the orthodox division between 
the two types of rights which is expressly made by Art 4.2 (although as suggested at 1.1.2 
above, the scope of Art 4.2 is open to debate). Moreover, changing texts does not in and of 
itself change realities. The financial limitations on states will continue to constrain the extent 
to which the subcomponents of Art 21 can be realised. If Art 21 was expressly designed to 
challenge orthodoxies of international law obligations which entail significant financ ia l 
implications, then it is a risky strategy. On the one hand, it risks the right to freedom of 
expression itself being seen as subject to progressive realisation, on the other it risks 
undermining good will towards and compliance with the convention if developing states are 
required to invest resources beyond their means in order to secure the immediate realisation of 
all elements of Art 21.29 And even then, such immediate realisation simply will not be possible 
for all, perhaps many, state parties. 
 
But at a deep philosophical and jurisprudential level something fundamental has irrevocably 
shifted here, as Mégret suggests. The blurring of political/civil rights with economic, social 
and cultural rights undermines the liberal legal subject, seen in political and civil rights terms 
as being independent, isolated and autonomous. This is because, in constructing civil and 
political rights as being interwoven with economic, social and cultural rights, the CRPD 
understands the legal subject as being interdependent and relational:30 we all need effective 
economic, social and cultural rights if we are truly to be able to exercise our civil or politica l 
rights. In this sense, the CRPD may be the vanguard of very fundamental change, the scope 
and impact of which we cannot really yet determine.  
 
5. Revisiting capacity: status, functionality, best interests and supported decision-
making 
 
The single most radical element of the CRPD is that it marks an attempt, which cannot yet be 
judged to have been successful or unsuccessful, to shift the paradigm with respect to the role 
that the concept of ‘capacity’, and third-party decision-making in the ‘best interests’ of persons 
found to ‘lack’ capacity, has in disability law and practice.  The CRPD states boldly, in Art 12, 
which is headed ‘equality before the law’, that: 
                                        
29 As Bartlett (n 16, 757) notes, discussing the point ‘Neither choice seems particularly appealing’.  
30 For discussion of these concepts, see for example Martha A. Fineman ‘Equality, Autonomy and the Vulnerable Subject in 
Law and Politics’ in Martha A. Fineman and A. Grear (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law 
and Politics (2013; Ashgate: Farnham Surrey). 
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1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognit ion 
everywhere as persons before the law.  
 
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.  
 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
 
For some, perhaps most, of those involved in the drafting of the CRPD this article was intended 
to prohibit national law from utilising ‘capacity’ as a mechanism to regulate both whether a 
person with disabilities is accorded legal rights and whether he or she is permitted 
independently to exercise those rights. This was based, first, on the conviction that even what 
is generally seen as the most morally defensible model of capacity – a ‘functional’ model which 
asks if the person in question can understand, retain and process information relevant to a 
decision, and communicate that decision to relevant others31 - has proven inadequate at 
prohibiting the values and preferences of third parties from percolating into the assessment of 
capacity, such that in truth often a covert ‘status-based’ test32 is deployed. In addition, the 
consequences of a finding of incapacity – most often a form of substituted judgement by a third 
party, ostensibly designed to make decisions in the best interests of the person found to lack 
capacity – was seen as licensing decision-making that alienated the person lacking capacity 
from their own life choices, and by implication often led to best interests judgements that did 
not in fact meet or even focus on the needs of the person with disability.  
 
Article 12.3 demonstrates the clear preference of the drafters of the CRPD for an alternat ive 
approach - supported decision-making – in preference to substituted judgment. The key 
difference is that supported decision-making is posited on the assumption that capacity to make 
                                        
31 This model of capacity is seen as morally defensible because it  does not judge the outcome of decision -making, leaving those with 
reduced but sufficient capacity to make their own decisions, even when from an objective point of view, the decision in question is unwise. 
Instead, this test asks only if the functional ability to process the relevant information is present. The English Mental Capacity Act 2005 is a 
fairly typical national law example of such an approach, and fairly typically the 2005 Act is headed by general principles of  minimum 
interventionism: an assumption that capacity is present, with the onus on those disputing that to displace that assumption; an obligation to 
take ‘all practicable steps’ to help a person achieve capacity; as well as an embargo on judging capacity by reference to the  substance of the 
decision made.  
32
 By contrast to a functional test, a status-based test simply assumes that membership of a class of persons – such as persons with learning 
disabilities, or children – necessarily entails lack of capacity. In the field of mental disability, status-based tests are these days almost 
universally condemned as discriminatory and unfit  for purpose. 
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one’s own decisions is always (or virtually always) in fact attainable, if the person of limited 
capacity is given the necessary assistance. For those in favour of supported decision-mak ing, 
an approach which determines the extent to which a person has or may act on their rights by 
reference to a test of capacity breaches the prohibition on discrimination which is recognised 
as both a fundamental principle33 and a general obligation of state parties;34 and, to underline 
its importance, is also accorded its own article35 in the CRPD.  
 
If this is correct, then it might be seen as unfortunate that the approach taken in the CRPD was 
to separate children with disabilities from adults with disabilities, and render children subject 
to the substituted judgement/best interests approach which dominates the CRC. If the CRPD 
had not made such provision, then children with disabilities would have had the same 
entitlement as adults with disabilities, to a supported decision-making rather than a substituted 
judgement approach. This would have in turn raised questions as to why children with 
disabilities had a greater entitlement to autonomous decision-making than other children, and 
exerted pressure to consider fundamental reform of the text of the CRC along the same lines. 
To me, it seems that one challenge – in terms of research needed – is to be able to articula te 
mechanisms which would bring supported decision-making for children into reality as the 
norm. This might involve, for example, the use of advocates or other support workers who take 
instruction from or act together with one or more children (depending on the situation), and of 
course training of professionals in a wide range of fields to provide such persons with the skills 
necessary to provide children with such support. No doubt other mechanisms could and should 
also be deployed.36 
 
Beyond this, there is a yet greater potential significance to the adoption of a supported decision-
making framework, which is deftly identified by Amita Dhanda:  
 
‘By setting up the paradigm of supported decision making, the CRPD unequivoca lly 
declares that it is possible to obtain support without being lessened or diminished. This 
paradigm of interdependence should be empowering and emancipatory for all of 
humanity and not just persons with disabilities’.37 
                                        
33
 Art 3(b). 
34
 Art 4.1. 
35
 Art 5. 
36
 See, mutatis mutandis, P. Weller, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the social model of health: new 
perspectives’ (2011) Journal of Mental Health Law 74, 77. 
37
 Dhanda (n 9), 50. 
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All this may be jumping the gun. As I have said, it remains to be seen whether this 
understanding of Art 12 becomes established internationally.38 Article 12.4 is in tension with 
Arts 12.1-3. Art 12.4 provides: 
 
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity 
provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to 
the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are 
free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the 
person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular 
review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The 
safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the 
person’s rights and interests. 
 
This provides for the possibility that a person will not in fact, even if Art 12.3 has been 
complied with to the fullest extent possible, have the capacity to make the decision in question. 
It therefore goes against the grain of the philosophy of the earlier elements of Art 12. And the 
drafting of Art 12 was a see-saw affair between the two camps, of substituted judgement and 
supported decision-making respectively.39 So it may be that the abandonment of capacity in 
this context is not yet upon us.40 
 
Nonetheless, it seems odd that the CRPD, which is so clearly intended to remove discrimina tion 
on any grounds against persons with disabilities, including discrimination based on that 
person’s age41 nonetheless supports and enhances, but does not challenge, the age-based 
discrimination which is inherent in the very idea that, by reason of age alone, children should 
be afforded less and lesser legal rights than adults, to be compensated merely with an obligat ion 
                                        
38
 Some state parties entered reservations in respect of Art 12 for fear that it  would render their own substituted judgment mechanisms for 
dealing with persons found to lack mental capacity unlawful, and others signed up to Art 12 but made an interpretative declaration upon 
ratification, to the effect that Art 12 would be interpreted in such a way as to permit substituted decision-making. On the other hand, the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in its recent Concluding Observations on the initial report of New Zealand 
CRPD/C/NZL/CO/1, 31 October 2014, para. 22, advised the state, which utilises substituted judgement, that it must ‘take immediate steps to 
revise the relevant laws and replace substituted decision-making with supported decision-making’. See also Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no. 1 Article 12: equal recognition before the law, CRPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014, para. 3, 
wherein the Committee notes that there has been ‘general failure to understand that the human rights-based model of disability implies a 
shift  from the substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decision-making’. 
39
 Amita Dhanda, ‘Legal capacity in the disability rights convention: Stranglehold of the past or lodestar for the future?’ (2006-2007)  34 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Com 429. 
40 See Fennell and Khaliq (n 16) and Bartlett (n 16). 
41
 See Preamble, para (P), Art 8.1(b);  
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placed on an adult decision-maker to give due weight to their views when making a substituted 
best interests judgment on their behalf. In other words, the paradigm-shifting question is why 
do the same arguments against status-based and functionality-based models of capacity which 
apply to adults with disabilities not also apply to the application of those models to people 
below the age of 18 years? The answer seems to be that those arguments are blocked and 
stymied by an essentialist understanding of children as a legal-political class which permeates 
and indeed animates the CRC: childhood in other words, as a matter of law, is constituted as a 
status-based limitation which is seen to affect, and delimit the capacity of, all children, 
regardless of actual ability. In the CRC, the essence of childhood is constructed in terms of a 
lack of capacity.  
 
It does seem innocuous that -whereas for adults the key issue of the moment is whether there 
will be a wholesale abandonment of capacity as a mechanism to determine who can make 
decisions for themselves and its replacement by a supported-decision-making model, with 
virtually no support left amongst the international community for a status-based approach - for 
children the shift from status to functionality has barely begun. Possible switch points - and as 
an English lawyer my point of reference is the decision in the case of Gillick v West Norfolk 
and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112, in which it was held that a child, on being able to 
demonstrate sufficient competence to pass a functional capacity test, should be entitled in law 
to make his or her own decisions - have been neutralised subsequently by being made subject 
to overriding best interests principles grounded in the status of that person as a child.42  
 
At the very least, it can be suggested that the coming into being of the CRPD raises the 
questions of whether (i) it is not now time to shift from a status-based to a functionality-based 
understanding of the limitations that simply being a ‘child’ as a matter of legal status places on 
a young person in terms of their abilities to make decisions for themselves, and; (ii) there should 
be, if not an abandonment of the best interests principle, then at least the severance of that 
principle from a substituted judgement framework for those children found to have functiona l 
capacity and its attachment instead to a supported decision-making model. The main difference 
is that the former is ‘objective’ (decision made by an adult) whereas the latter is ‘subjective’ 
(decision made by the child) in orientation. In short, a child with capacity would have the legal 
right to decide his or her own best interests. The more radical question, of whether (iii) it is 
                                        
42
 This situation has been theorised, for example, by Eekelaar’s concept of ‘autonomy interest’, which subsumes autonomy, and rights, 
within a ‘best interests’ framework. See J. Eekelaar ‘The emergence of children’s rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161. 
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possible to shift the default position from childhood denoting presumptive lack of capacity, to 
childhood not being of itself sufficient to displace the presumption of capacity which applies 
to adults, is also raised (and with it a host of related questions such as whether the balance 
between protection and autonomy is currently appropriately figured). To put this differently, if 
there is widespread consensus that human rights are best protected by a ‘social’ model of 
disability, which locates the essence of the problem in the way in which society at large fails 
to make adequate accommodation for people with impairments, rendering such persons at risk 
of discrimination, how do we explain the lack of any comparable ‘social model of childhood’ 
which similarly views childhood as a time of vulnerability by reason of the same ‘attitudina l 
and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others’? What would the CRC and ICL in general look like if a ‘social model 
of childhood’ were to be adopted, whereby different treatment is prima facie discrimina tion 
and disempowerment? And if this is not the right question to ask, why not? And what is the 
right question? 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
In this chapter I have considered the implications of the arrival of the CRPD for ICL and the 
CRC in particular. I have suggested that not only does the CRPD contain important new rights 
and entitlements for children with disabilities, but that some of its provisions have the potential 
to improve the situation for children more generally, and, taken in its totality, the 2006 
convention does justify the paradigm-shifting claims that have been made for it. At the least, 
the CRPD demonstrates how various rights in the CRC could be made more robust, and it 
points the way to greater involvement of individuals, communities and other actors such as 
NGOs in the formulation of law and policy. Beyond this, the way the CRPD restructures 
orthodox understandings of rights and their limits, rejects tests of capacity as disempowering 
and discriminatory, and does on the philosophical basis of a ‘social model’ of disability, raise 
far-reaching and awkward questions regarding the continued viability of an essentialist, status -
based, non-socialised, construction of children and their rights.  
